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ABSTRACT 
 
 A large body of research exists that examines the punitiveness of prison compared 
to a wide variety of alternative sanctions. Generally, this research finds that there are 
numerous demographic and contextual differences in the way that people experience the 
punitiveness of prison. In this paper, I expand that research by using data from over 900 
inmates to examine whether they view military service as more punitive than 
incarceration.  The research suggests females, Blacks, and those who have not had prior 
military service are more likely to desire imprisonment as opposed to military service. 
However, Whites and veterans appear to embrace the idea of military service as an 
alternative to imprisonment. The practicality of using military service as opposed to 
incarceration is also discussed.  
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 The story of James Foreman is one of redemption and escape.  Foreman grew up 
in a notoriously rough and crime ridden inner-city neighborhood in Atlanta where he 
regularly faced prostitution, drug use, and violence.  At the age of 22, Foreman found 
himself with no real direction.  He decided to try the United States Army at the urging of 
his mother, as it could provide an escape from perils of the streets of Atlanta.  He obliged 
and, through some motivation from others in the military, his decision led to a 30 year 
career with the Army where he recently retired as a Sergeant Major.  His case is truly a 
testament of the ability of the structure and opportunities provided by the military to 
improve the lives of those that venture down such a path (Little, 2010). 
 In late August 2011, millions of people on the United States’ east coast awaited 
Hurricane Irene and the media were laden with coverage about the looming disaster and 
preparation efforts.  As the hurricane battered states along the eastern seaboard, another 
tragedy occurred.  This tragedy did not come from the rage of nature, however; it came 
from the rage of a United States Army veteran.  Captain Leonard Egland was a veteran of 
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.  During the storm, he murdered his ex-wife, her 
boyfriend, and her boyfriend’s son in Virginia.  Egland then fled to Pennsylvania where 
he murdered his former mother-in-law before injuring a police officer in a shootout then 
killing himself (News Limited, 2011). 
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 These two cases stand in stark contrast to one another and represent the wide 
array of potential outcomes from military service.  These diverse cases may partly 
explain why there has been a resurgence of a dialogue concerning the use of military 
service in lieu of imprisonment.  A great amount of anecdotal evidence exists that 
suggests a number of people have performed military service instead of doing time in 
prison, but from a legal perspective, this is prohibited.  Almost no research exists that has 
considered the thoughts of inmates regarding the issue though the sanction would directly 
impact them. 
This exploratory thesis will examine the multiple facets of using military service 
as an alternative correctional sanction in an attempt to determine the feasibility, 
challenges, and consequences that would surround using such a sanction.  Due to 
significant budgeting concerns, especially within criminal justice and corrections, 
alternatives to the expensive sentence of incarceration are being utilized frequently which 
makes this topic worthy of consideration.  
In this thesis, I begin with a comprehensive review of the literature regarding 
alternative sanctions, exchange rates, correctional boot camps, and military regulations 
and cases surrounding enlistment in lieu of incarceration.  The literature review will be 
followed by an explanation of the methodology through which a survey was administered 
to prisoners that considers their views of various alternative sanctions using exchange 
rates.  This will be followed by a presentation of the results of the analysis and then a 
discussion of the findings, limitations, and implications of the research. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Alternative Sanctions 
Despite the fact that the United States comprises just 5% of the world’s 
population, 25% of all incarcerated individuals worldwide are incarcerated in the United 
States (Gottschalk, 2002).  In light of this staggering fact, some argue that imprisonment 
is used excessively as a criminal sanction in the United States.  The overuse of 
corrections in the U.S. does not apply exclusively to incarceration.  In fact, in 2009 there 
were 5,018,855 people on probation or parole in the U.S. (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 
2010). 
When examining the two traditional options of incarceration and probation, one 
should consider that the offender in the least punitive prison has the potential to have a 
much more punitive experience in the correctional system than does the most severe 
offender that received probation as a sanction (May & Wood, 2010; Morris & Tonry, 
1990).  Bearing this in mind, Morris & Tonry (1990) suggest that, instead of limiting 
sentences to incarceration or probation, there should be a range of sanctions available for 
offenders, sanctions they refer to as alternative sanctions because they are designed to 
serve as alternatives to incarceration in prison (Morris & Tonry, 1990; Petersilia & 
Deschenes, 1994a).  ―Alternative sanctions‖ are defined as an assortment of sentences 
that are thought to fit somewhere in a range of severity that places traditional probation at 
one end of the spectrum and traditional incarceration at the opposite end.  There are many 
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terms used to describe alternative sanctions, such as ―alternatives to incarceration,‖ 
―alternative sanctions,‖ ―sentencing alternatives,‖ ―intermediate sanctions,‖ ―intermediate 
punishments,‖ among others (May & Wood, 2010).  The list of possibilities for 
alternative sanctions includes fines, house arrest, boot camps, electronic monitoring, 
community service, and others (Frana & Schroder, 2008; May & Wood, 2010; Morris & 
Tonry, 1990). 
There are several advantages that alternative sanctions offer.  They can reduce the 
problem of overcrowded prisons, rehabilitate the offenders that take part in alternative 
sanctions, increase safety for the public, and cut costs to state and federal corrections 
systems (May & Wood, 2010; Petersillia, 1998).  May and Wood (2010) also identify 
other benefits associated with alternative sanctions.  They suggest that alternative 
sanctions provide a sentencing option for those offenders whose risk to public safety is 
not high enough for prison, but whose risk is too high for probation.  The use and 
improvement of alternatives should give rise to a constructive continuum of sanctions 
that can be used to sentence offenders.  Every state in the U.S. has begun using some 
form of alternative sanction; this widespread use may serve as some evidence of their 
usefulness. 
Though alternative sanctions have become rather popular (Doleschal, 1982; May 
& Wood, 2010), they have problems as well.  The most commonly cited criticism of 
alternative sanctions is that of net widening (May & Wood, 2010).   Doleschal (1982) 
holds that prosecutors, as well as judges, use alternative sanctions to increase social 
control while having only a limited impact on defendants’ recidivism.  The concept of net 
widening first appeared in the 1970s as a criticism of diversion within the juvenile justice 
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system.  The contention is that implementing alternative sanctions causes a great 
expansion of correctional control because more people are brought under the umbrella of 
correctional supervision (Klein, 1979; Lemert, 1971; May & Wood, 2010).  Additionally, 
alternative sanctions possess the propensity for discrimination by various program 
officials due to the discretion that is involved with alternatives, which can negatively 
affect how some groups may view alternatives (May & Wood, 2010).      
A number of researchers have also assessed how prisoners perceive the severity of 
alternative sanctions.  This research has shown that many prisoners would rather serve 
their sentence in prison until they are unconditionally released instead of taking part in 
alternative sanctions due to the high likelihood of being withdrawn from the alternative 
and being forced to serve prison time anyway (Frana & Schroeder, 2008; May, Wood, 
Mooney, & Minor, 2005; Petersilia & Deschenes, 1994; Spelman, 1995; Wood & May, 
2003). 
Despite this recent evidence that many inmates prefer prison over some 
alternative sanctions, most people, whether they are citizens, policymakers, or 
researchers, still follow the traditional notion that probation anchors the lower end of a 
continuum of sanctions (including the alternatives previously mentioned) and 
incarceration serves at the severe extreme.  However, increasing evidence indicates this 
traditional continuum of sentencing options is problematic (Crouch, 1993; May & Wood, 
2003; May & Wood, 2010; Petersilia, 1990; Petersilia & Deschenes, 1994a; Petersilia & 
Deschenes, 1994b; Spelman, 1995; Wood & Grasmick, 1999). 
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Background of Exchange Rates 
As mentioned earlier, alternative sanctions are designed to fill that space that is 
found between prison and probation (Morris & Tonry, 1990). Nevertheless, recent 
evidence suggests that continuum (with probation as the least restrictive sentence and 
prison as the most restrictive) may be flawed.  In order to determine the level of severity 
that each sanction offers, opinions of legislators and judges are typically used.  However, 
this group tends to have no rating mechanism to determine severity of sanctions.  
Lawmakers do not use data that is based on experience in their decisions about 
punishments (May & Wood, 2010; Morris & Tonry, 1990).  To counter this limitation, a 
limited amount of research examines how offenders perceive the various alternative 
sanctions that are imposed on them which is a cause for concern (May & Wood, 2010). 
Over the last 20 years, several researchers have made efforts to bring some clarity 
to the continuum of alternative sanctions through various types of measures (May & 
Wood, 2010).  Until recently, there have been methods used to measure severity of 
alternative sanctions.  Two of these methods have been used in corrections research; they 
are comparative judgments and magnitude estimation (May & Wood, 2010).  Each is 
discussed in detail below. 
The comparative judgments measure is the most basic of the traditional measures.  
Respondents are given the option of two punishments and asked which of the two 
punishments they consider to be the more severe.  Using this method allows the 
respondent to place the included sanctions on a scale of severity (May & Wood, 2010).  
For example, a researcher may ask a respondent to consider electronic monitoring and 
house arrest as two sentences that the offender may receive.  If electronic monitoring was 
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viewed as more severe than house arrest to the respondent, then the researcher would 
deem electronic monitoring as the more punitive of the two on a scale. 
The next method is magnitude estimation.  In this method, a respondent is 
provided a standard punishment that is given a 100-point value.  Then, this respondent 
will give a score to other sanctions when compared to the standard, 100-point 
punishment.  If a punishment is seen as more severe, then it would be given a value over 
100 and those viewed as more lenient would be given a value of less than 100 (May & 
Wood, 2010).  One problem here is that the validity associated with magnitude estimation 
is dependent upon often uncertain mathematical skills of the inmates that would serve as 
respondents (May & Wood, 2010; Petersilia & Deschenes, 1994b). 
The decade of the 1990s brought a new technique to measure the severity of 
incarceration when compared to the various alternatives that are available, a technique 
that came to be known as an ―exchange rate.‖  This measurement strategy began in 
Oklahoma in May of 1995 when Peter Wood interviewed a group of seven inmates that 
had experience in prison and at least one alternative sanction about their perceptions of 
the severity of prison compared to alternative sanctions.  From this focus group, Wood 
and his colleagues developed a survey whereby inmates could select an amount of time 
(measured in months) of some alternative sanction that he or she would be willing to 
serve in lieu of serving a particular amount of time in prison.  The amount of time the 
inmate would serve to avoid prison becomes that sanction’s ―exchange rate.‖   
In practice, then, inmates are given a description of the various types of 
alternative sanctions and are then asked to think about an established amount of time 
(usually, 12 months) at a medium security prison.  The respondent is asked the number of 
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months that they would be willing to serve of each alternative in order to keep from 
serving one year actual prison time at the medium security institution, without ―good 
time‖ being an option (May & Wood, 2010). 
With this technique, inmates can record their individual feelings about how severe 
each alternative is, while also indirectly ranking the alternatives and prison along a 
continuum of severity.  If an inmate would prefer to serve fewer months of an alternative 
sanction to avoid the 12 months of incarceration, then that alternative is considered more 
punitive than incarceration.  If an inmate prefers some time that is greater than 12 months 
to keep from serving 12 months of incarceration, then incarceration is considered to be 
more punitive.  This technique gives the inmates a flexible way to evaluate imprisonment 
and alternative sanctions while also ranking all options based on punitiveness (May & 
Wood, 2010). 
Over the past decade, May and Wood (2010) have used exchange rates to 
examine the severity of several alternative sanctions.  Their research has considered the 
punitiveness of prison compared to the punitiveness of boot camp, standard probation, 
day reporting, county jail, electronic monitoring, intensive supervision probation (ISP), 
halfway house, community service, day fine, and intermittent incarceration.  The pair 
uncovered several significant findings using exchange rates.  They found that a wide 
variety of respondents (inmates, probationers, parolees, judges, probation officers) agree 
that standard probation is the least punitive of the sanctions considered.  They also found, 
however, that certain groups tend to view prison as less punitive than their counterparts.  
Males, Blacks, older prisoners, and offenders that have been previously incarcerated do 
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not view prison as severe as females, Whites, younger prisoners, and offenders with no 
history of incarceration, respectively.  These findings are discussed in detail below.   
Demographic and Contextual Issues using Exchange Rates.  The research on 
exchange rates has revealed significant differences in how some groups differ in their 
opinions regarding punitiveness of sanctions.  The research has been particularly 
enlightening in the areas of race, gender, previous prison experience, and age.   
Race as an indicator.  A number of researchers have considered the impact of 
race in the criminal justice system.  Blacks make up 42% of the prison population in the 
United States, while they are only 13% of the total population.  Further, in 2007, white 
males were six times less likely to be imprisoned than their black counterparts (May & 
Wood, 2010; West & Sabol, 2008). Opinion polls in the U.S. have revealed that Blacks, 
when compared to Whites, have a much greater likelihood of believing that Blacks are 
treated more severely within the criminal justice system.  They are also more likely to 
believe that law enforcement discriminates against alleged offenders that are Black and 
also have less confidence that policing agencies respond to Whites and Blacks in a 
consistent, fair manner.  Blacks also see protection by police in neighborhoods that are 
predominantly African-American as worse than in neighborhoods that are predominantly 
White (May & Wood, 2010; Tuch & Weitzer, 1997; Weitzer & Tuch, 1999). 
 Regarding perceptions of sanctions and race, researchers have also determined 
that Blacks see a prison term as less punitive than Whites.  These studies also found that 
Blacks may see alternative sanctions as more severe than Whites (Crouch, 1993; May & 
Wood, 2010; Spelman, 1995; Wood & May, 2003).  Wood & May (2003) studied 136 
probationers in Indiana using exchange rates.  The pair examined whether the race of the 
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respondent made a difference in preference for prison over alternatives, the length of an 
alternative that a respondent would serve to avoid prison, and why the respondents would 
avoid alternatives.  They found that Blacks, in general, were more likely to prefer prison 
over alternatives than Whites.  Blacks were two or three times more likely than Whites to 
select a prison term instead of boot camp, county jail, halfway house, or electronic 
monitoring.  Further, Blacks were between three and six times more likely to select 
prison instead of day reporting, intermittent incarceration, day fine, standard probation, or 
ISP (May & Wood, 2010; Wood & May, 2003). 
 There were similar findings in the study when the length of time of the 
alternatives that respondents were willing to serve was examined.  The researchers 
compared the duration of each alternative the respondents were willing to serve to avoid 
4, 8, and 12 month terms in a medium-security prison.   When compared to Whites, 
Blacks ranked alternatives as more severe in every prison term length.  In fact, Whites 
would regularly accept an alternative sanction at least two times longer than Blacks when 
asked to how long they would serve to avoid prison.  With the exception of county jail, 
these racial differences were statistically significant (May & Wood, 2010; Wood & May, 
2003). 
 Blacks and Whites both viewed boot camp and county jail as the most severe of 
the sanctions for each length of imprisonment to which the alternatives were compared.  
Further, both groups ranked regular probation as the least punitive sanction.  Blacks, 
however, saw boot camp as the most punitive while Whites saw county jail as the most 
punitive.  Prison was rated third in severity for Whites after county jail and boot camp, 
11 
 
but prison was rated seventh, ninth, and tenth on the 4, 8, and 12 month scale for Blacks 
(May & Wood, 2010; Wood & May, 2003). 
 One reason for these differences in exchange rates between Black and White 
offenders could be a difference of risk assessment concerning incarceration.  May and 
Wood (2010) state three dynamics that could be causes for this difference in viewpoints.  
The first explanation is that Blacks view prison as less punitive than Whites, so they have 
a higher likelihood of choosing incarceration over alternative sanctions than Whites.  
Secondly, African-Americans could view alternative sanctions as a ―hassle‖ due to strict 
rules and cruel program officers.  Finally, Blacks may believe that a much greater risk of 
revocation exists with alternative sanctions than Whites, causing Blacks to have less 
desire to engage in alternatives (May & Wood, 2010;). 
 Ultimately, Wood and May (2003) conclude that Blacks view all alternative 
sanctions as more severe than Whites and that a greater percentage of Blacks reject 
options to participate in each of the alternatives.  Further, Blacks are significantly more 
likely to agree with rationales to avoid alternatives to incarceration (May & Wood, 2010; 
Wood & May 2003).  Race is not the only demographic that exchange rates have shed 
light on; exchange rates also reveal that gender has a significant impact on how one will 
perceive alternative sanctions. 
Gender as an indicator.  Wood, May, and Grasmick (2005) examined gender 
differences in preference for alternative sanctions by using exchange rates with prisoners 
from Oklahoma and probationers from Kentucky and Indiana using the same 
measurement of exchange rates reviewed above.  The authors could find no previous 
study that observed gender differences in perception of severity of alternative sanctions 
12 
 
when compared with the severity of prison.  From the sample of Oklahoma inmates, the 
researchers found that women would more readily take part in alternatives than would 
men.  Women had a much lower rate of refusing the alternatives of boot camp, ISP, day 
fine, community service, standard probation, and intermittent incarceration.  Females, 
when compared to males, were also not as willing to participate in halfway house or 
electronic monitoring though.  Respondents, both male and female, rated county jail and 
boot camp as considerably more punitive than prison (May & Wood, 2010; Wood, May, 
& Grasmick, 2005). 
 Data gathered from samples of probationers and parolees in Kentucky and 
probationers in Indiana were revealing as well.  Women ranked boot camp as the most 
punitive sanction and county jail as the second most punitive.  This ranking order was 
reversed for male respondents.  Both groups ranked standard probation and community 
service as the least severe sanctions.  Males were willing to serve shorter sentences to 
halfway house, day reporting, electronic monitoring, standard probation, and day fine to 
avoid one year of medium-security incarceration.  Overall, although males and females 
seem to rank the punitiveness of alternative sanctions in a consistent manner, females 
seem more open to alternatives than do males (May & Wood, 2010). 
 May and Wood (2010) suggest a number of explanations for these findings.  They 
suggest that women are often the main care-givers for children, thus making incarceration 
a more severe option when compared to alternative sanctions because imprisonment 
denies the possibility to care for a child.  If a woman is a single mother, her incarceration 
could cause the loss of child custody.   Another possibility is that many states have a 
limited number of prisons that are designated for women (some only have one) so serving 
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a prison sentence can geographically displace women from their families.  Finally, 
women and men could have different means of weighing costs and benefits that could 
cause the discrepancy (May & Wood, 2010). 
 In sum, regardless of the explanation, females appear to be much more open to the 
possibility of alternatives to incarceration than males.  Additionally, electronic 
monitoring, halfway house, and boot camps were less popular with women than men.   
Age as an indicator.  Just as males and females differ in willingness to participate 
in alternatives to incarceration, age is a factor when considering desire to participate in 
alternative sanctions (Frana & Schroeder, 2008; May, et al., 2005; May & Wood, 2005) 
and how much of an alternative an offender would serve to evade incarceration.  Older 
offenders are significantly less likely to want to engage in any of the alternative sanctions 
than younger offenders.  There are several explanations regarding why this may be the 
case.  An older prisoner may have become familiar with the setting of prison and thus be 
more content with serving out their prison sentence than to attempt to fulfill their sanction 
under supervision in the community.  Older offenders could also see alternatives as more 
risky than do younger offenders.  In the eyes of older offenders, the chances of failing to 
complete their alternative sanction and being forced to serve in prison, which would 
lengthen the overall duration of their sentence, may be too high and thus make alternative 
sanctions less attractive.  Another explanation is that older offenders may believe that 
their overall time under some type of sanction will be lower if they simply begin at 
incarceration, skipping alternatives completely (May & Wood, 2005).   
Prison experience as an indicator.  To examine prison experience and 
perspectives on punitiveness of sanctions, May, et al. (2005) used exchange rates with a 
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population comprised of parolees and probationers located in Kentucky.  In order to 
ascertain if prison experience influenced how a respondent viewed punitiveness of 
sanctions, the responses of those among the population that had done time in prison were 
compared to responses from those who had not been incarcerated. They compared the 
amount of each alternative the respondents were willing to serve to avoid 4, 8, and 12 
month terms in a medium-security prison (May, et al., 2005).   
            Prison was not the most punitive sanction, according to the views of the 
respondents, regardless of whether they had been incarcerated or not.  Boot camp and 
county jail were viewed as the most punitive sanction and community service and 
standard probation were seen as the least severe.  May and Wood (2010) found that 
prison experience seems to be a noteworthy predictor of the participants’ ideas about the 
severity of one or more of the alternative sanctions.  Those that had experience with 
incarceration rated prison as the fifth most severe of the sanctions, while those that have 
no prison experience ranked it as the third most severe of the sanctions.  Respondents that 
had prison experience were the only respondent group that perceived community service 
as the least severe sanction while all other groups rated standard probation as the least 
punitive.  Additionally, prison experience, by and large, reduced how much time an 
alternative that respondents would readily serve to avoid prison.  Respondents that had 
experience with incarceration were also more likely to prefer prison over any amount of 
time of an alternative when compared to respondents with no prison experience (May and 
Wood, 2010). 
            May and Wood (2010) offer several reasons why this could be the 
case.  Offenders that have previously served time in prison could be less afraid of prison 
15 
 
compared to offenders with no experience in prison.  Further, those with experience 
know what to expect and could believe that prison is easier than some alternatives 
because of the lack of privacy, amount of supervision, or high chance of revocation that 
are associated with alternatives.  Offenders may also see prison as a way to escape 
responsibilities that could come with alternatives (May & Wood, 2010; Williams, May, 
& Wood, 2008).  Many offenders view prison as easier than alternatives and realize that 
one can be released from prison faster than the time it would take to serve out an 
alternative sanction (May & Wood, 2010).  Some prisons may also be more comfortable, 
may offer more protection, and may also offer better dietary habits, education, and job 
training than some offenders are accustomed to in their lives outside of prison (May & 
Wood, 2010; Morris & Tonry, 1990). 
            In sum, one important common denominator has been found in the studies 
examining perceptions of the punitiveness of prison.  Prison (as a sanction) is viewed as 
less punitive to males, Blacks, offenders with prison experience, and older prisoners 
when compared to their counterparts (females, Whites, offenders without prison 
experience, and younger prisoners, respectively).  Explanations for why each specific 
group perceives prison as less punitive vary, but the results nonetheless are in direct 
conflict with the traditional continuum of sanctions that Morris and Tonry (1990) claim is 
a continuum with probation at the lenient end and prison at the punitive end. 
Correctional Boot Camps as Alternatives to Prison 
Of the wide variety of alternative sanctions used today, perhaps the most 
restrictive is correctional boot camps; it is certainly viewed as one of the most punitive by 
all samples described above.   One explanation for this finding is that correctional boot 
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camps are the alternative most like military service.  In this alternative sanction, prisoners 
take part in military drills and engage in physical labor and exercises that emphasize team 
work.  In theory, correctional boot camps have the potential to meet the criminal justice 
system’s goals of deterrence, punishment, and incapacitation (Parent, 1989).  Like other 
alternative sanctions, correctional boot camps may also reduce costs because they reduce 
prison overcrowding (Frana & Schroeder, 2008; MacKenzie & Shaw, 1990; Parent, 
1989).   
Correctional boot camps are similar to basic training programs in the military.  
Boot camp staff members take on the role of drill sergeants and other superiors and are 
addressed by such titles.  Uniforms are worn by both participants and staff and good 
personal appearance is stressed (MacKenzie, Wilson, & Kider, 2001).  These military 
style boot camps were first used in the correctional system in 1983.  According to Cronin 
(1994), the popularity of these programs grew quickly and boot camps are present in the 
juvenile justice, federal, and state systems.  Some evidence suggests that participants in 
these boot camps graduated with a more positive outlook on their ability to change in 
comparison to inmates completing a term in a traditional prison (MacKenzie & Shaw, 
1990).  Unfortunately, poor aftercare and little follow-up for boot camp graduates caused 
this optimism to subside (Salerno, 1994).  Kurlychek and Kempinen (2006) determined 
that those offenders that finished an aftercare program after their time at boot camp had a 
lower recidivism rate when compared to a group of former boot camp participants that 
did not receive aftercare.  MacKenzie et al. (2001) examined recidivism rates between a 
group of offenders that participated in correctional boot camps and a group that was 
either put on community supervision or was incarcerated.  They reviewed 29 different 
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studies that were published in journals and government reports. Mackenzie et al. (2001) 
found that there were no statistically significant differences in recidivism between the 
two groups.  This further diminishes the previously high value placed on the possibility 
of boot camps to rehabilitate offenders. 
            With the popularity of boot camps in the late 20
th
 century, there has been a 
resurgence of a conversation regarding the use of military service in lieu of 
imprisonment, much like how alternative sanctions such as boot camps are currently used 
in lieu of imprisonment.  The following section looks at the history of using enlistments 
for the criminally deviant and examines significant milestones in that history that have 
brought us to the point today where there is a dialogue of using military service as an 
alternative sanction. 
Military Regulations, Coerced Enlistments, and Military Service as an Alternative 
            Coerced enlistments, or the notion of them, are not a new phenomenon.  For 
decades there have been several claims of judicial actions allowing military enlistment in 
lieu of imprisonment.  Nevertheless, although there is supporting anecdotal evidence, 
official documentation of only one legal use of enlistment has been found (Mattick, 
1960).  Forced military service has been used at multiple points in history for various 
reasons.  In the past, compulsory military service has filled the ranks of the military in 
times of need and, in some cases, has been used for more ―malevolent‖ reasons.  The 
practice can be concretely traced back to the 1700s when the British used the method 
during the American Revolutionary War by forcing sailors fighting for the colonies to 
join the British cause when they were captured.  Later, during the War of 1812, the 
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British continued this practice.  Military service being used in lieu of other sanctions for a 
crime didn’t appear until later, however (Dilloff, 1976). 
            The first recorded time that military service was used as an alternative sanction of 
which I am aware occurred in the United States during World War II.  This practice was 
used between 1940 and 1947.  According to Mattick (1960), 2,942 male inmates from the 
state of Illinois were paroled from prison (not sentenced to military service) contingent 
upon their service with the U.S. Army.  Regardless, this is an example of governmental 
use of military service as means for dealing with criminals.  An interesting part of this 
unorthodox parole tactic is that a follow–up study of recidivism among parolees was 
completed eight years after the release from prison.  The recidivism rate for the men that 
were paroled during the same time frame as the men that were paroled into the military 
was more than four times greater and that of the almost 3,000 prisoners that served in the 
Army.  Of the military parolees, only 3.4 percent were found in violation of their parole 
terms (Mattick, 1960). 
            The prevalence of using military service as an alternative sanction increased in the 
1960s during the Vietnam War.  This type of coerced enlistment was not generally a 
problem involving crooked military recruiters, but instead involved civilian judges with 
―good intentions‖ for the criminals that they were sanctioning.  Others with malevolent 
objectives (e.g., counselors in reform schools, legal guardians, police officers, and 
probation officials) have intervened to force such a deal on offenders (Dilloff, 
1976).  Anecdotal evidence gathered through interviews with various law enforcement 
officials supports this claim.  Multiple active law enforcement personnel that I 
interviewed in the course of this thesis research claimed that they have been involved in 
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negotiations with state prosecutors and military recruiters to allow an offender to avoid 
pending criminal charges and the sanctions that would come with prosecution if they 
agreed to enlist in the military (personal communication, May 16, 2011). 
            Each branch of the military has addressed military service as an alternative 
sanction in some fashion and the regulations are derived from a federal statute designed 
to keep ―undesirable people‖ from enlisting in the military.  10 U.S.C. § 504 (2006) 
states: 
(a) Insanity, desertion, felons, etc.--No person who is insane, intoxicated, or a 
deserter from an armed force, or who has been convicted of a felony, may be 
enlisted in any armed force. However, the Secretary concerned may authorize 
exceptions, in meritorious cases, for the enlistment of deserters and persons 
convicted of felonies (p. 257) 
Importantly, this federal statute does not address those that have been convicted of 
misdemeanors, which may be the people most likely to be considered for military service 
in lieu of other criminal sanctions.  Also, the statute does not address the idea of choosing 
between military service and incarceration as it would exist as a deal to prevent 
conviction (Dilloff, 1976, U.S. v. Catlow, 1974).   
            With the exception of the United States Navy, each of the four branches of service 
has a regulation that specifically prohibits military service in lieu of incarceration or other 
forms of sanction for criminal events.  Army Regulation 601-201 (4-35) states: 
Recruiting personnel will not— 
a. Take part directly or indirectly in release of a person from pending charges so that he 
or she may enlist in the Army as an alternative to future prosecution or further adverse 
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juvenile or adult proceedings. Equally important, recruiting personnel will in no way 
contribute, either directly or indirectly, to the false notion that the Army condones such a 
practice. Persons subject to a ending charge are not eligible for enlistment; therefore, they 
are not eligible for pre-enlistment processing to determine mental or medical eligibility. 
b. Take part in any way in obtaining release of a person from any type of civil restraint so 
that he or she may enlist or complete enlistment processing to determine enlistment 
eligibility. The term civil restraint includes confinement, probation, parole, and 
suspended sentence. Accordingly, persons under the type of civil restraint that makes 
them ineligible for enlistment are not eligible for processing to determine mental and 
medical eligibility for enlistment, except for those individuals authorized to take the 
ASVAB test in accordance with paragraph 2–11a(2). 
c. Process any person who has a doubtful criminal status. For example, while not 
classified as a specific ―pending charge,‖ an applicant may have a possible indictment or 
arrest pending; further, the recruiter may have obtained information that indicates the 
applicant’s character may be questionable. These situations cannot be defined as an 
absolute in the qualification or disqualification process. When doubt exists as to the 
possible pending arrest, indictment, or pending nature of an offense, clarification must be 
obtained through the chain of command. For example, clarify, via the chain of command, 
an applicant’s eligibility and ―questionable moral character‖ if the applicant claims no 
arrest record and no pending charge, but local law enforcement officials indicate that the 
applicant is a suspect and it is possible that charges are about to be filed. Document any 
decision on such matters in the remarks section of DD Form 1966 or attach a memo for 
record to the residual file indicating the result and the decision on the matter. (p. 48) 
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This regulation is straightforward and clearly prohibits using military service as an 
alternative to prison, specifically stating that one should not be enlisted if they have any 
criminal charge that is pending (Dilloff, 1976).   
            The United States Air Force also addresses the issue in AFRSI 36-2001.  
Enlistment is prohibited when a recruit: 
Item 6.  Is under restraint (as defined in paragraph 4.8.7.) imposed by civil or criminal 
court or is the subject of a subpoena ordering attendance on some future date (specified 
or unspecified). 
Item 7.  Is released from restraint (as defined in paragraph 4.8.7.) on the condition of 
entering military service where restraint would be imposed again if applicant did not 
enter military service.  
Item 8.  Is released from civil suit or criminal charges on the condition of entering 
military service when the suit or charges would be reinstated if the applicant did not enter 
military service. 
Item 9.  Has civil suit or criminal charges filed or pending. Exception: In civil suits only, 
a person may enlist or be commissioned provided he or she obtains an unqualified, 
definitive statement of nonappearance from legal or court officials. (This requires an 
eligibility determination from HQ AFRS/RSOP or RSOC.). (p. 32) 
This regulation is also clear about the prohibition of the ―military or jail‖ alternative.   
            The Marine Corps speaks to the matter in its regulations during the discussion of 
ineligible categories that cannot be waived in MCO P1100.73B: 
1. Enlistment as an Alternative to Prosecution. Applicants may not enlist as an 
alternative to criminal prosecution, indictment, incarceration, parole, probation, or other 
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punitive sentence are not eligible for enlistment. They are ineligible for enlistment until 
the original assigned sentence would have been completed (p. 2-27). 
Despite the regulations of the aforementioned military branches, and even though 
the Marine Corps is within the Department of the Navy, to my knowledge, the U.S. Navy 
does not have a specific regulation that forbids using military service in lieu of 
incarceration.  Nevertheless, the Commander of Navy Recruiting did send a related notice 
to Navy personnel on December 24, 1974.  This notice discussed enlisting individuals as 
a substitute for criminal prosecution.  The commander condemned this practice, stating 
that police, probation, and court officials sometimes approach Navy recruiters and 
suggest such an agreement that is not supported by the Navy.  The commander stated that 
the Navy is made up entirely of volunteers and that federal legislation will be sought to 
ensure that military service as an alternative to incarceration does not occur (Dilloff, 
1976). 
            For each branch of the armed services to prohibit using the military to replace a 
prison sentence, or any other sanction for that matter, such an arrangement must have 
been dealt with at some point in the history of the military.  Three court cases appeared 
around the Vietnam War, the time that ―military or jail‖ scenarios became more 
prevalent.  These cases were important in this discussion and they have helped shape the 
current policies.   
 The seminal case concerning coerced enlistments (Dilloff, 1976) is United States 
v. Catlow (1974) involving a teenager from New Jersey.  When Thomas Catlow was 16 
years old, he was arrested; the sanction for the juvenile charges that he faced was five 
years detention, which the judge told him was his only option unless he enlisted with the 
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U.S. Army for three years.  While in the Army, Catlow was taken to trial for military 
offenses, to include going AWOL, and claimed that he never wanted to join the Army, 
but did so to avoid detention for crimes committed while he was a civilian.  He claimed 
to be out of the court’s jurisdiction because he was forced into service, which, as outlined 
previously, was against the Army’s regulations.  On appeal to the United State Court of 
Military Appeals, the court decided that it could not be proved that Catlow’s case served 
as a constructive enlistment and ruled in favor of Catlow (Dilloff, 1976; U.S. v. Catlow, 
1974). 
            The following year, another significant case appeared with similar details as seen 
in Catlow.  In United States v. Dumas (1975) the defendant in a military trial joined the 
military when he was a minor to avoid juvenile detention.  However, Dumas’s legal 
guardian, his mother, did not give consent for him to join the Army.  The court ruled in 
favor of the military, but the case was sent to the Court of Military Appeals, which ruled 
in favor of Dumas; the military enlistment was voided due to the absence of consent and 
the ultimatum between detention and military service (Dilloff, 1976; U.S. v. Dumas, 
1975). 
            Another case, decided in the same year as Catlow, is also of great importance to 
the discussion of military service as an alternative sanction.  In United States v. McNeal 
(1974), McNeal was recruited to the Army out of a reform school in order to avoid 
remaining in the school and was told that it would keep him out of jail.  Also, consent for 
him to join was given by a person who was not his legal guardian (at the time of 
enlistment, McNeal was 17).  The Court of Military Appeals ruled that the Army did not 
have jurisdiction over McNeal (U.S. v. McNeal, 1974)  This case greatly expanded the 
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ruling of Catlow because it stated that any recruiter misconduct that led to enlistment was 
grounds to deny that a constructive enlistment occurred (Dilloff, 1976).   
            In sum, the courts have generally ruled that the ―choice‖ between military service 
and incarceration is not a choice, but a coerced decision.  These cases, and the necessity 
of a policy against using military service in lieu of prison, show that there is a propensity 
for this sort of arrangement to occur.  This propensity is compounded by the fact that the 
military now consists entirely of volunteers, which presents the potential problem of not 
having an ample amount of volunteers (Dilloff, 1976), particularly during a time such as 
this writing where the United States military is deployed on two fronts. 
Previous Inmate Thoughts on Military Service as an Alternative Sanction 
            Prior to this research, only one study that I am aware of has considered offender’s 
ideas on using military service as an alternative sanction.  The study was completed in 
Frankfort, Kentucky in 2008.  Frana and Schroeder (2008) surveyed prisoners at 
Frankfort Career Development Center (FCDC) from a quantitative and qualitative 
perspective.  FCDC is a minimum security work camp for 205 inmates.  Frana and 
Schroeder (2008) suggest that, given the relatively minor and non-violent crimes for 
which they are being detained, FCDC contains a prison population that would most likely 
be candidates for military service as a sanction.  FCDC inmates are transported into the 
community to complete an array of unskilled jobs, often with limited supervision.  Three 
in four (76%) inmates at FCDC were completing sentences for drug or property 
crimes.  Taking a life course theory approach, the researchers looked at how connections 
with conventional society can cause one to desist from crime, in this case how military 
service can rehabilitate and what inmates think about this unconventional sanction.  Frana 
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and Schroeder hypothesize that prisoners would support the use of military service in 
corrections and that it could be rehabilitative (Frana & Schroeder, 2008). 
The pair surveyed 30 prisoners and conducted qualitative interviews with 11 
prisoners.  First, the inmates were asked if they would trade an eight year prison sentence 
for eight years of military service, day for day.  Three in five (60%) inmates stated that 
they would accept such a deal.  Next, the prisoners were asked whether they would 
accept military service as an alternative to parole; 43% of the respondents agreed to this 
scenario.  The third question posed was whether the inmate would be willing to serve half 
of an eight year sentence in the military in lieu of eight years imprisonment; 70% of 
respondents said they would agree (Frana & Schroeder, 2008).   
During the qualitative interviews, many inmates stated that they would not 
consider military service in each scenario because the country was in a time of war and 
they had no desire to see the battlefield.  Others stated that the structure, job 
opportunities, and prospect of bettering oneself offered by the alternatives are 
attractive.  The researchers concluded that military service was a feasible alternative to 
incarceration that was popular among many respondents and proposed that military 
service should be considered by legislators as an alternative sanction, particularly in lieu 
of imprisonment (Frana & Schroeder, 2008). 
Problem Statement 
            Throughout correctional policy-making history, perspectives of those most 
affected by correctional policy (inmates) have generally not been considered, especially 
when forming and adopting various legislation regarding sentences for offenders.  This 
holds true in the discussion of alternative sanctions.  The traditional continuum of 
26 
 
alternatives outlined by Morris and Tonry (1990) two decades ago did not consider the 
views of the population that these alternatives are intended to, ideally, rehabilitate.  By 
using the exchange rates method, offender views have now been considered.  This 
method has allowed offenders to rank-order alternative sanctions presented to them in 
terms of severity.  This is significant because their perceptions have proven to be in stark 
contrast to the traditional continuum (defined by standard probation at the lenient end and 
incarceration at the severe end).  Measuring offender beliefs through exchange rates has 
shown that there are differences between certain demographic and contextual 
characteristics of offenders.  Specifically, research has shown that males, Blacks, 
offenders with prison experience, and older prisoners are more likely to view prison as 
less punitive (May and Wood, 2010). 
            The discourse on alternative sanctions has changed over the past few decades as it 
has expanded from considering only probation to now consider a wide array of 
possibilities of alternative sanctions in use today.  Nevertheless, it is important to note 
that exchange rates have never been utilized to examine military service as an alternative 
sanction, despite the anecdotal evidence reviewed above that suggests military service 
has been used (although unofficially) as an alternative sanction for many years.  Though 
the research using exchange rates when considering offender views has been useful to the 
discussion of alternative sanctions, researchers have not yet considered offender views on 
the possibility of using military service as an alternative to incarceration.  In this study, I 
will begin that effort.  Using data collected from over 1,000 Kentucky inmates, I will use 
exchange rates to examine offenders’ views of military service as an alternative sanction 
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while considering the important demographic issues of race, gender, and age and the 
contextual issue of experience in prison.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
In the fall of 2008, Professor David May approached the Kentucky Department of 
Corrections to request permission to interview prisoners regarding their perceptions of 
the punitiveness of prison as a sanction and their perceptions of their likelihood of 
recidivism upon release from prison.  The research protocol for the study was approved 
by both the Kentucky Department of Corrections and the Eastern Kentucky University 
Institutional Review Board in the fall of 2009; data for this study were collected from six 
state correctional institutions in Kentucky soon thereafter.   
In the following section, I begin with a discussion of the data collection process.  
That discussion is followed by a presentation of the findings from the data collection 
organized by gender, race, and age, as these three variables have a demonstrated 
association with most of the concepts under study here.    
Sample Selection 
In selecting the prisons for this study, five prisons that housed minimum- and 
medium-security inmates in both eastern and western Kentucky and the only public 
institution that housed females in the state were targeted.  In consultation with the 
Kentucky Department of Corrections, these six prisons were chosen because they were 
thought to be likely to yield large enough proportions of Black and female inmates to 
make meaningful comparisons between racial and gender groups in terms of both 
correctional program participation and likelihood of recidivism.  Additionally, because 
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the primary focus of this research was to examine predictors of the inmates’ perceptions 
of their likelihood of recidivism upon release, Professor May worked with the 
Department of Corrections to identify only those inmates that were within 12 months of 
their parole hearing or release date.  By this strategy, he hoped to collect data from 
inmates that were seriously considering life outside of prison upon release.  The final 
sample consisted of 1,234 respondents, which represented 11 percent of the 
approximately 11,500 inmates housed in minimum- and medium-security facilities 
operated by the state in July 2010 (as listed on the Kentucky Department of Corrections 
Website for the minimum- and medium-security institutions). 
On the day of survey administration, the research team arrived at the prison 
between 7 and 9 a.m. In consultation with the prison administrators, the researchers were 
placed in a location designated to insure privacy for the respondents yet allow between 50 
and 100 inmates to complete the questionnaire in one sitting and began surveying inmates 
immediately after the morning ―count‖ was completed.  As inmates arrived to that 
location, members of the research team welcomed them, then ―called roll‖ to insure that 
all inmates that were present fit the criteria of being within 12 months of their parole 
hearing or their release date.  After verifying that all inmates were on the list, the research 
team then described the purpose of the study, its voluntary and anonymous nature, and 
asked that all inmates that did not want to participate return to their daily activities.   
After the inmates that did not want to participate departed, the researchers 
provided a letter of consent to the inmates.  This letter:  a) explained the purpose of the 
study; b) informed the respondent that their participation was completely voluntary and 
that they were free to answer any, all, or none of the questions; c) assured them of the 
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confidential and anonymous nature of the study; and d) asked for the respondent’s 
signature giving informed consent.  The researcher then asked respondents whether they 
would prefer to complete the letter and survey themselves or have these read to them.  
When one or more inmates indicated they would like to have the survey read aloud 
(which occurred in most of the survey administrations), a member of the research team 
read the survey aloud.  The other member of the research team circulated throughout the 
room to answer any questions that respondents might have.   
As with any institutional setting, a response rate for this survey is difficult to 
calculate.  In the institution where the females were housed, the research team was able, 
with the help of the correctional staff, to provide the opportunity for every inmate that 
was on the provided list to participate in the survey.  In that institution, only 8 of the 305 
eligible inmates refused to participate in the research.  In the other institutions, members 
of the research team were never able to speak to all inmates who were on the list 
generated by the institution in the week prior to our visit because of academic 
programming, work details, court, etc.  Nevertheless, of those inmates that were given the 
opportunity to complete the survey, only 1 in 10 chose not to participate. 
Survey Instrument 
The instrument used to collect the data was a 15-page questionnaire adapted from 
the one used by Wood, May, and their colleagues in a number of studies (see May & 
Wood, 2010, for a review of those studies).  The original instruments used in those 
studies were developed after extensive consultation with incarcerated prisoners in focus 
groups in Oklahoma and Mississippi.  Because several studies have demonstrated the 
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reliability of the aforementioned instrument, Professor May replicated the instruments 
used for those analyses as closely as possible in this effort.  
Independent Variables.  Respondents were presented with a series of questions 
designed to assess demographic characteristics and their own correctional experiences, 
along with a number of questions asking them about the causes and consequences of their 
criminal involvement, their experiences with correctional programming while 
incarcerated, and their perceptions of the likelihood of recidivism upon release.   
 In addition to the respondents’ perceptions of their likelihood of recidivism upon 
release and their experiences with correctional programming, background information on 
age, gender, race, education, marital status, employment status before incarceration, 
reasons for avoiding and committing crime, and their perception of the goals of prison 
was collected.  The demographic and contextual variables are displayed in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive and Contextual Variables 
 
The 1,234 respondents included 827 Whites, 340 Blacks, 18 Hispanics, 7 
American Indians, and 35 multiracial inmates. So that the data would be useful for the 
 Frequency Percentage Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
Gender 
 
Male 727 77.8    
Female 208 22.2 
Race 
 
Black 261 27.9    
White 674 72.1 
Veteran  
Status 
Veteran 93 9.9    
Non-Vet 842 90.1 
Previous 
Incarceration 
Yes 782 83.6    
No 153 16.4 
Months of Prev. 
Incarceration 
   48.12 24.00 63.37948 
Age    35.85 34.00 10.137 
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analyses that were to be used, the data were cleaned.  As one of the purposes of this study 
was to examine the difference between Whites and Blacks regarding perceptions of 
likelihood of recidivism upon release, all respondents who did not indicate that they were 
White or Black or did not describe their race were discarded from the data.  Additionally, 
any respondents that did not indicate their gender were omitted.  For the question that 
asked the exchange rate (―What is the number of months of military service you would 
take to avoid serving 12 months actual time in prison‖), many respondents answered with 
non-numerical answers such as ―life‖ and ―any amount‖ while still others responded with 
an extraordinarily high number of months (or years).  There was a limit of 240 months 
for the question (20 years) so any amount that was above that number of months or was a 
non-numerical answer as previously mentioned were recoded to 240 months. 
After cleaning the data, the sample included 935 respondents.  Of the 935 
respondents, males comprised 77.8% of the sample while 27.9% of the respondents were 
Black.  The average age of the respondents was 35.85 years old with a median of 34.  
Respondents were also asked about their military veteran status.  One in ten was a veteran 
(9.9%).  Respondents were also questioned about their education.  Almost three out of 
four (72.9%) had a high school diploma or higher.  Finally, respondents were also asked 
if they had previous experience with incarceration.  A large majority (83.6%) of the 
respondents said that they had been incarcerated prior to the current incarceration.  The 
mean months of previous incarceration was 48.12 months while the median was 24 
months. 
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Dependent Variables. 
Military Exchange Rate.  Respondents were then asked to state the maximum 
number of months of various correctional alternatives (including military service) that 
they would serve to avoid 12 months actual time in a medium security prison, and 
whether or not they had ever participated in each of those alternatives.  The first 
dependent variable in this study (the military exchange rate) is based on the respondents’ 
answer to a question asking them to ―think about 12 months actual time in a medium 
security correctional center‖ and indicate the ―maximum number of months of military 
service you would take to avoid serving 12 months actual time in prison.‖  The mean 
number of months in the military respondents would serve to avoid prison was 22.48 
while the media was 12 months.  The exchange rate and the responses to the other 
military variables can be seen in Table 2. 
Tendency to Join Military.  Respondents were also asked a series of questions 
regarding situations when they would choose to serve in the military over prison.  
Responses to these questions are presented in Table 2 and the wording of those questions 
is presented in Appendix A.  The responses presented in Table 2 indicate that, when 
asked whether they would accept four years flat military enlistment plea, if charged with 
a felony that carries a maximum eight year sentence, 73.6% stated that they would.  
When asked if they would accept military enlistment for a term equal to their prison term, 
with no parole, 68.7% agreed that they would do so. When asked if they would enlist in 
the military in lieu of their current sentence, day-for-day, 58.9% stated that they would. 
When asked if they would enlist if it served as their parole and they still had to serve their 
in-custody sentence, 54.8% agreed to do so. 
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Table 2. Military Variables 
 Freq. Percent. 
Would you accept military day for day? 
     Yes 
     No 
 
592 
 
63.3 
  
340 36.4   
Would you accept military option as your 
parole? 
 Yes 546 58.4 
 No 384 41.1 
Would you accept military term equal to prison 
term (no parole)? 
 Yes 690 73.8 
 No 242 25.9 
Would you accept a 4 year flat military term as a 
plea to an 8 year felony sentence? 
 Yes 739 79.0 
 No 192 20.5 
If convicted of a crime while in the military as an 
alternative, you would be sent to prison.  Would 
this change your answers? 
 Yes 686 73.4 
 No 207 22.1 
If the military was not at war, would this change 
any answers? 
 Yes 197 21.1 
 No 731 78.2 
Have you ever served time in the military?  Yes 93 9.9 
 No 842 90.1 
What is the maximum number of months of 
military service you would take to avoid serving 
12 months actual time in prison? 
Minimum= 0; Maximum =240 
Mean 
22.48 
Median 
12 
Std. Dev. 
40.775 
 
Respondents were then asked if they would still agree to military enlistment in the 
previous questions, on the terms that they would be sent back to prison to serve their 
original sentence for any criminal conviction.  Two in three (67.4%) agreed that they 
would.  They were then asked if they would change any of their answers if the military 
were not involved in a war, which it is; only one in five (21.1%) said that they would 
change their answers if the U.S. were not involved in war.  Respondents who answered 
―no‖ to the previous questions concerning military service were asked to explain their 
negative responses. 
I used principal axis factor analysis (with direct oblimin rotation) on the 
aforementioned questions regarding military service as an alternative to estimate the best 
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scale that would measure one’s likelihood to view the military favorably.  The results of 
the factor analysis can be found in Table 3.  The initial factor analysis uncovered only 
one factor on which the variables loaded; on that factor, five of the six variables loaded at 
.30 or above.  These five variables were then used to create an index to measure the 
respondent’s general tendency to join the military.   
 
Table 3. Factor Analysis for Military Variables 
Question Factor Score 
If the courts give you the option of enlistment in the military as an 
alternative to incarceration in lieu of your current sentence, would 
you accept this option (example: an eight-year sentence you would 
enlist for 8 years of service, day for day, with no time off for good 
behavior). 
.794 
Would you accept this option if it served as your post-release 
supervision (parole) and you still had to serve your in-custody 
sentence? (Example: an eight year sentence with parole guaranteed 
after three years you would have to serve three years, then enlist for 
five years service). 
.653 
Would you accept this option if the enlistment were equal to your 
time to serve (prison term) with no post-release supervision 
(parole)? (Example: An eight-year sentence with 3 years before 
parole eligibility you would have to enlist for 3 years of service). 
.749 
If you were charged with a felony that carries a maximum 8 year 
sentence, would you accept 4 years flat military enlistment as a 
plea? 
.687 
Any criminal conviction you received during your time enlisted will 
result in revocation of sentence and you would be sent back to 
prison to serve out your original sentence.  Because this would be a 
condition of any deal, would you still agree to this? 
.268 
If the military were not involved in a war, as it currently is, would 
this change any of your answers to those questions about military 
service instead of prison? 
.625 
 
Multivariate Analysis 
 Multivariate linear regression is useful because it allows a researcher to observe 
the influence of an independent variable on the dependent variable while also controlling 
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a number of variables.  Furthermore, it allows a researcher to examine the strength of the 
association between a dependent variable and an independent variable in comparison 
with other independent variables concurrently (Soderstrom, 2008).  For this study, I 
estimated four multiple linear regression models.  Each is described in detail below.  
Prior to estimating the multiple linear regression models, following the 
recommendations of Fox (1991), I conducted analyses to diagnose whether collinearity, 
outliers, non-normality, nonlinearity, and nonconstant error variance were present in the 
data under study here.  These efforts identified 25 outliers that were problematic.  These 
cases were identified as outliers because of the respondent’s score on the military 
exchange rate dependent variable.  In the original data set, some respondents provided 
answers that indicated they would do an extremely large number of months of military to 
avoid 12 months in prison while others responded with an answer that was not numeric 
(i.e., any amount, life, as many months as it took).  In the recoding of the data, I truncated 
responses that were over 240 months and those that were nonnumeric responses like 
those described above to 240 months (25 cases total) because a number of respondents 
indicated they would do 240 months to avoid 12 months in prison.  Models were then 
estimated both with (Table 4) and without (Table 5) these cases.  Because none of the 
predictors (other than the dependent variable, whose treatment of missing data was 
discussed earlier) used in this study contained more than 10% missing data and because 
various procedures for handling missing data are likely to produce similar results when 
small numbers of cases are missing in large data sets, I employed listwise deletion of 
cases with missing data. 
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Table 4.  Military Exchange Rates Regressed on Demographic and Contextual 
Predictors (all cases) 
Variable         B/SE                      Beta                     t                      Sig. 
Gender 
Race 
Age 
Veteran 
Prior Prison Experience 
Willingness to serve in the 
military 
 
Constant 
   1.969/3.434                .020                  .573                  .567 
  -6.060/3.039              -.066                  -1.994               .046 
  -.331/.146                  -.082                  -2.266               .024 
3.445/4.669                .025                  .738                   .461 
   .011/.023                   .017                  .482                   .630 
   6.379/.812                  .264                 7.855                 .000 
 
11.083/6.382                                      1.737                 .083 
R
2
 .088 
F; significance 14.127; p<.001 
df 883 
 
 The results of the first regression model are presented in Table 4.  In that model, 
the exchange rate representing how many months of military service the respondent 
would endure to avoid 12 months in prison was regressed on gender, race, age, veteran 
status, prior prison experience, and willingness to serve in the military.  The results 
presented in Table 4 indicate that race (B= -.066, p<.05), age (B=-.082, p<.05), and 
willingness to serve in the military (B=.264, p<.001) have a statistically significant 
association with the exchange rate; in other words, Whites, younger respondents, and 
respondents with a higher general willingness to serve in the military had significantly 
higher exchange rates than their counterparts.   Gender, veteran status, and prior prison 
experience did not have a statistically significant association with exchange rate. 
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Table 5.  Military Exchange Rates Regressed on Demographic and Contextual 
Predictors (25 Outliers Removed) 
Variable         B/SE                      Beta                     t                      Sig. 
Gender 
Race 
Age 
Veteran 
Prior Prison Experience 
 
Willingness to serve in the 
military 
 
Constant 
  3.027/1.446                .069                 2.093                  .037 
 -2.701/1.272               -.068                -2.124                 .034 
  -.134/.061                  -.077                -2.195                 .028 
  2.510/1.975                .042                 1.271                  .204 
  -.001/.010                  -.003                 -.099                  .921 
3.955/.340                  .377                11.642                 .000 
 
  5.519/2.669                                         2.067                 .039 
R
2
 .176 
F; significance 30.404; p<.001 
df 858 
 
 The results of regressing how many months of military service the respondent 
would endure to avoid 12 months in prison was on gender, age, veteran status, prison 
experience, and willingness to serve in the military after the aforementioned outliers were 
removed are presented in Table 5.  The results of this model show that gender (B=.069, 
p< .05), race (B=-.068, p<.05), age (B=-.077, p<.05), and military likelihood (B=.377, 
p<.001) had statistically significant associations with the exchange rate.  Thus, males, 
Whites, younger respondents, and respondents with a higher general willingness to serve 
in the military had significantly higher exchange rates than their counterparts.  The 
variables of veteran status and prior prison experience do not have a statistically 
significant association with the exchange rate. 
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The results of regressing the variable representing willingness to serve in the 
military on gender, race, age, veteran status, and prison experience are presented in Table 
6.  The results of this model show that gender (B=.174, p<.05), race (B=-.188, p<.05), 
and veteran status (B= .137, p<.05) had a statistically significant association with 
willingness to serve in the military.  In other words, males, Whites, and veterans were 
significantly more likely than their counterparts to be willing to serve in the military.  
Prior prison experience did not have a statistically significant association with 
willingness to serve in the military. 
 
Table 6. Willingness to Serve in the Military Regressed on Demographic and 
Contextual Predictors 
Variable         B/SE                      Beta                    t                      Sig. 
Gender 
Race 
Age 
Veteran 
Prior Prison Experience 
 
Constant 
.720/.141                    .174                 5.121                 .000 
  -.714/.124                  -.188                -5.760                 .000 
  -.004/.006                  -.022                 -.592                  .554 
.769/.192                    .137                 4.001                 .000 
  -.001/.001                  -.026                 -.763                  .462 
 
3.324/.240                                         13.829                 .000 
R
2
 .080 
F; significance 15.181; p<.001 
df 883 
  
In Table 7, the exchange rate represented how many months of military service 
the respondent would endure to avoid 12 months in prison was regressed on gender, age, 
prior prison experience, and willingness to serve in the military and three dummy 
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variables created to examine the interaction between race and veteran status (with black 
non-veterans as the reference group).  The results of this model show that gender (B= 
.072, p<.05), age (B= -.078, p<.05), willingness to serve (B= .372, p<.001), black 
veterans (B= .092, p<.05), and white non-veterans (B= .101, p<.05) had a statistically 
significant association with the exchange rate.  In other words, males, younger 
respondents, and respondents with a higher general willingness to serve in the military 
had significantly higher exchange rates than their counterparts.  Further, this shows that 
black veterans had a significantly higher exchange rate than black non-veterans and a 
higher exchange rate than white veterans. 
 
Table 7. Black Non-Veteran Reference Group Regressed on Dummy Variables 
and Demographic and Contextual Predictors 
Variable         B/SE                      Beta                    t                      Sig. 
Gender 
 
Age 
 
Prior Prison Experience 
 
Willingness to serve in the 
military 
 
Black Veterans 
 
White Veterans 
 
White Non-Veterans 
 
Constant 
3.164/1.443                .072                 2.193                 .029 
  -.136/.061                  -.078                -2.231                .026 
  -8.389E-5/.010           .000                 -.009                  .993 
3.901/.339                  .372                11.493                .000 
   
  10.180/3.653              .092                  2.786                 .005 
 
3.531/2.443                .052                  1.445                .149 
 
3.770/1.339                .101                  2.816                .005 
 
2.158/2.742                                          .787                 .431 
R
2
 .182 
F; significance 27.107; p<.001 
df 858 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Discussion 
 In this study, I used data from 935 respondents to examine predictors of inmates’ 
preference for military service over prison.  This research is significant due to the limited 
amount of previous research regarding military service as a potential alternative sanction.  
A previous study (Frana & Schroeder, 2008) considers the possibility as well and is the 
only other research of this nature to date.  I greatly expand on the knowledge regarding 
military service as a sanction due to a much larger sample of inmates and consideration 
of many other variables, especially in regards to the focus of veteran status.  It is 
important to note that the context of this discussion is that, here, veterans are being 
compared to offenders as opposed to veterans being compared to nonveterans.   
Consequently, when benefits or drawbacks of military service are discussed, I discuss 
those as a comparison to the benefits (or drawbacks) of military service over 
incarceration in prison.  
 An additional improvement offered by this research is that these analyses consider 
offenders’ viewpoints about the punitiveness of prison in general, as there are a limited 
number of studies that consider the view points of those people that corrections policies 
will directly impact (Richards & Ross, 2003).  In addition, this research uses exchange 
rates to consider military service as an alternative to incarceration, which had not yet 
been considered. 
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As previously mentioned, anecdotal evidence certainly exists that situations where 
military service is used to avoid prison arrangements have occurred.  Such an agreement 
seems to have occurred with particular offenders based on charges and previous 
correctional experience (personal communication May 16, 2011) which presents an 
interesting notion regarding the potential for military service to be utilized as an 
alternative sanction.  The first important question from this notion revolves around the 
topic of which offenders should be allowed to make these arrangements.  Intuitively, the 
most likely group of offenders for such a sanction would be non-violent offenders.  The 
average military service exchange rate for the sample is 22.48 (SD= 40.775), which 
shows that, generally, military service is considered less punitive than prison.  If military 
service was used in lieu of prison, then, it would be essential to determine where on a 
continuum of alternatives military service is situated so that only appropriate offenses 
merit such a sanction.   
Other characteristics of offenders should also be considered (e.g., age, prior 
record, previous prison time, and physical and mental ability to serve).  As the findings of 
this research suggests, young offenders would be more willing to serve in the military to 
avoid prison.  Implementing such a sentence and applying it to younger offenders could 
increase the possibility of the alternative to have positive effects on the offender. 
A unique finding of this research is found in the regression analysis that uses 
Black nonveterans as a reference group.  The findings from this analysis indicate that 
Black veterans are significantly more likely to accept military service as an alternative to 
incarceration than Blacks that had not previously served in the military.  This is an 
important finding because it has been suggested that Blacks could adjust to prison more 
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seamlessly than other groups because they may find friends and relatives already in 
prison than can give them advice, protect, and goods in prison (Crouch, 1993; May & 
Wood, 2010).  Additionally, among those respondents who had not served in the military, 
Whites were willing to serve significantly more time than Blacks to avoid prison.  Thus, 
the racial differences in preference for military service appear to only apply to 
nonveterans; this difference does not apply to Black veterans.  Thus, for Blacks, military 
service appears to reduce the impact of race on choice to avoid prison; in other words, 
being a veteran appears to be a more important master status when explaining military 
service in lieu of prison than race.  Given the results of the analysis, age may have 
possibly been an important factor in determining the discrepancy in exchange rates for 
the two groups.  Future research should seek to expand this effort in an attempt to 
understand this complex interaction.   
The impact of gender on military exchange rates is equally as intriguing, although 
perhaps easier to explain.  May and Wood (2010) have found that, generally, females are 
more open to alternatives than males even though they tend to view them similarly in 
terms of punitiveness.  The findings of this research reveal that women view military 
service as an alternative significantly more punitive than do males which contradicts 
previous claims regarding women alternatives.  This causes a rethinking of gender and 
alternative sanctions because women are not more inclined to accept this potential 
alternative sanction than men.  There could be a number of reasons that women are less 
likely to desire military service as an alternative sanction.  One reason May and Wood 
(2010) suggested for the discrepancy between men and women regarding alternatives in 
lieu of prions could apply here.  Often, women are the main care-givers for children (to 
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include single mother situations) which makes incarceration a more severe option when 
compared to alternative sanctions because imprisonment denies the possibility to care for 
a child.  Similarly, military service could deny the possibility for child care, especially 
due to the chance that they could be geographically displaced.  Another potential reason 
for this difference could be the pervading masculinity and use of aggression and violence 
within the military that defines hierarchies in the military that contribute to the forming of 
hegemonic masculinity (Hinojosa, 2010). 
One unexpected finding was that when the exchange rate was regressed on the 
veteran status variable (see Tables 4 and 5), there was no significant association between 
the two.  This counterintuitive finding causes one to pause and consider potential reasons 
that this could be the case.  The data could suggest that this group of veterans did not 
have a particularly favorable experience in the military, causing them to respond 
negatively to the idea of using military service as an alternative sanction.  One potential 
answer might be that veterans may have taken part in the Vietnam War and this could 
have contributed to negative feelings toward military service.  However, the mean age of 
the respondents was 45 meaning that, by the time they met age requirements to join the 
military, the Vietnam War would have been over (by 7 years).  Further, this still doesn’t 
explain why Black veterans responded in a comparatively positive nature to questions 
regarding military service as an alternative to incarceration.  The Department of Veteran 
Affairs is often heavily criticized for a multitude of reasons such as inadequate medical 
services and lengthy waiting periods for treatment that could contribute to the generally 
unfavorable stance that veterans take on military service as an alternative to 
incarceration. 
45 
 
Military service may have many benefits for offenders.  Instead of sending an 
offender to prison where they will experience an employment gap and will not be able to 
provide monetary support for families, military enlistment could give them a potential 
career and the ability to support a family that is not at fault for the crime committed, 
given that service as a sanction is a paid venture.  Thus, this alternative would not face 
the problem of re-entry because the offender would have gainful employment through the 
military.  Another benefit that military service would have for offenders would be the 
ability for offenders to receive benefits from the GI Bill.  This includes money for tuition 
to attend school, a housing allowance each month, and funds for text books.  Further, 
offenders that participate in military service to be eligible for VA guaranteed loans.  
These housing loans have require a very small or no down payment and they have 
competitive interest rates; they can be used for property for a home, purchasing a home or 
condominium, repairs, and refinancing.  These benefits could greatly assist offenders in 
managing life after their sentence (Department of Veteran Affairs, 2006). 
Just as there are potential benefits to using military service as an alternative 
sanction, there are also drawbacks.  For such an alternative to exist, it would be necessary 
to change current military policy to allow for such an arrangement, which would seem to 
be a difficult step given the ―all volunteer service‖ mentality that the military currently 
has. 
Ethical concerns are a potential quandary for the alternative’s implementation as 
well.  Many view military service as an honorable life path and it is possible that using 
military service as a correctional punishment could be seen as diminishing the integrity 
associated with service.  Furthermore, the military regularly denies recruits the 
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opportunity to serve for various reasons (including for previous criminal activity).  In 
light of this, it would seem contradictory for the military to allow convicted offenders to 
serve in the military, while having denied many from joining its ranks due to previous 
crimes.   
An offender’s beliefs could be a problem for sentencing as well.  In much the 
same manner that ethical concerns arose during past military drafts, some offenders may 
be opposed to the military for various reasons (e.g., opposition to war, philosophical or 
religious beliefs that disagree with military service).  Would it be ethical to impose a 
sanction on an offender with such beliefs?  Given this notion, should offenders be given 
an option to perform military service if they agree with it and such a sanction suits their 
crime?  It is quite possible that many would view giving offenders an option of sentences 
should not be a practice of ―justice.‖ 
The all-volunteer nature of military service today makes the idea of coerced 
enlistments and especially military service as a correctional punishment (through official 
court proceedings or otherwise) a significant point to ponder.  Similarly, the U.S. Code 
would likely need to be reformed to allow for this arrangement to occur.  Though Frana 
and Schroeder (2008) suggest that it is unlikely that military service as an alternative 
sanction would be viewed as ―a mere slap on the wrist,‖ this perception may not be the 
case.  The current political landscape and the pervading idea of being ―tough on crime‖ 
could be highly critical of military service as an alternative.  In a time when 
unemployment is quite high and many are denied military service, there would likely be 
many detractors of such an alternative that would give convicted criminals an occupation 
that has benefits during service and after. 
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Using military service as an alternative could also be criticized because it could 
force civilians into military service, potentially subjecting them to negative experiences 
of military service.  One such experience is Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD).  The 
Department of Veteran Affairs (2007) reports that PTSD is found in about 30% of 
Vietnam War veterans, in 10% of Gulf War veterans, and in 11-21% of veterans in the 
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.  If military service as a sanction becomes utilized as an 
alternative, at least some offenders would surely experience PTSD.  However, Powell, 
Holt and Fondacaro (1997) found PTSD was prevalent in 21% of inmates at a prison in a 
rural northeastern state experienced PTSD symptoms within 6 months prior to the study 
(in accordance with DSM-III-R exclusionary criteria).  Granted that neither research 
specifies if the PTSD is due to their experience with the military or incarceration, 
respectively, it shows that military service may not necessarily put offenders at a greater 
risk for PTSD. 
There are other negative implications that military service could have that should 
also be considered.  Homelessness, drug and alcohol addiction, and suicide are potential 
negative experiences that those sentenced to a military service sentence could experience.  
Granted, this could be the case for those that are exposed to a prison sentence as well, but 
it is nonetheless an impact that should be considered.  Additionally, with a military 
service sanction is the possibility of death, especially if the service was in a combat role.  
Coupled with the previously discussed characteristics that should be considered for this 
sanction (namely, physical and mental ability), it would seem that using this sanction 
could be determining fitness to be killed which is another ethical predicament. 
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An important point can be taken from the literature on boot camps regarding the 
Department of Veteran Affairs and the potential of using military service as an 
alternative.  Poor aftercare and little follow-up for boot camp graduates caused optimism 
in the potential of boot camps to subside (Salerno, 1994).  Kurlychek and Kempinen 
(2006) found that offenders who finished an aftercare program after their stint at boot 
camp had a lower recidivism rate compared to a group of former boot camp participants 
that did not receive aftercare.  Taking this into account, it would be likely imperative for 
aftercare programs to be in place for a military service alternative to be successful.  
However, it is quite possible that this may be a task that the Department of Veteran 
Affairs may not be capable of providing, if it would be a function of the department.  
Given that the hypothetical aftercare service was a result of a criminal proceeding, it is 
feasible that it would be considered a function of the Department of Corrections. 
The consideration of aftercare with a military service sentence provides a nice 
starting point for an important contemplation in the discussion of military service as an 
alternative.  Academics have suggested that there has been a militarization seen in 
criminal justice, particularly through the dealings of police forces.  Examples can be seen 
through the emergence of police paramilitary units in a huge number of local, state, and 
federal agencies.  Events such as the war on drugs, Waco, Ruby Ridge, and MOVE have 
shown the potentially detrimental effects that militarizing criminal justice can have.  
Correctional boot camps are structured after military units (Kraska & Kappeler, 1997) 
which shows a link between corrections and military functions.  Certainly using military 
service as an alternative sanction would further blur this line, creating an undeniable and 
inseparable link between corrections and the military, the Department of Corrections and 
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the Department of Defense, which has a propensity to be problematic.  This could be 
another link that shows the militarization of society.  Militarization can be seen in 
multiple facets of society to include police, industry, ideology, journalism, national 
security and tourism and it is occurring on a global level (Enloe, 2007). 
Limitations 
 
 This research project is not free of limitations.  One limitation is that the questions 
used on the survey were provided by the Department of Corrections and are not Likert 
scale questions where Likert scale questions could have given greater insight into the 
views of offenders regarding the issues. One specific question ―If you were charged with 
a felony that carries a maximum 8 year sentence, would you accept 4 years flat military 
enlistment as a plea?‖ may not be an appropriate question because it specifies a felony 
charge.  In the following section, the type of offenses that may be best suited for such an 
alternative will be discussed.  It is quite possible that felonies may not be well suited for a 
military service alternative.  Given this possibility, the previously stated question may not 
be a relevant question.  One variable measured in this study was prison experience.  This 
variable was measured in number of months that an offender has been incarcerated prior 
to their current sentence, which does not consider the amount of time that the offenders 
have served on their current sentence.  Considering the length of time served in the 
current sentence could make the prison experience variable more accurate. 
 The generalization of the sample considered could be problematic as well.  This 
research looks exclusively at Kentucky prisoners which may cause the results from this 
sample study to differ from results elsewhere.  Further, one group focused on, military 
veterans, is a very unique group.  This group has prison experience and they are military 
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veterans which are two distinct characteristics that could cause generalization to the 
population to be questionable. 
I began this effort with minimal knowledge about inmate feelings concerning the 
possibility of military service in lieu of imprisonment.  This exploratory work has 
contributed to the understanding of alternative sanctions, specifically offender views of 
alternative sanctions using exchange rates, and has done so through the addition of a 
potential and relevant alternative that had been previously considered.  Military service as 
a sanction differs from other alternatives in some important ways.  Females are less likely 
to accept it as a sanction.  Additionally, regarding race, inclination to accept this 
alternative depends on previous military experience.  It is not the case with a military 
service alternative that the less prison experience one has, the more likely they will select 
an alternative because for this option, prison experience is irrelevant.  The inquiry into 
this alternative sanction may have created more questions than it answered, but there is 
now a better understanding of the intricacies of the possibility of this alternative sanction.  
Future researchers could attempt to uncover why prior military service impacts African 
Americans’ willingness to accept a military service alternative despite African Americans 
generally not being willing to accept the alternative in lieu of imprisonment.  Also, 
researchers could consider potential explanations as to why women are less likely than 
men to accept this alternative though women, in general, are more willing to accept 
alternatives to imprisonment.  Qualitative research could also gain valuable insight into 
these specific populations and their thoughts on military service as an alternative.  
Further, qualitative research could increase knowledge on the issue by determining 
reasons that offenders have the feelings that they do regarding the alternative.  Research 
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outside of offender views could also contribute to the knowledge concerning this topic.  
Military service as an alternative sanction is worthy of discussion within the realm of 
alternative sanction given the history of its usage as an alternative, though illegal, and 
there are still many aspects of this alternative that should be explored. 
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APPENDIX A: 
Opinions about Military Enlistment In Lieu of Prison Sentence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
59 
 
If the courts gave you the option… 
would you accept this option (example:  an eight-year sentence you would enlist 
for 8 years of service, day for day, with no time off for good behavior). 
Would you accept this option if it served as your post-release supervision (parole) 
and you still had to serve your in-custody sentence? (Example:  an eight-year 
sentence with parole guaranteed after three years you would have to serve three 
years, then enlist for five years service). 
Would you accept this option if the enlistment term were equal to your time to 
serve (prison term) with no post-release supervision (parole)? (Example:  An 
eight-year sentence with 3 years before parole eligibility you would have to enlist 
for 3 years of service). 
If you were charged with a felony that carries a maximum 8 year sentence, would 
you accept 4 years flat military enlistment as a plea? 
If the military were not involved in a war, as it currently is, would this change 
any of your answers to those questions about military service instead of prison? 
If you answered YES to any of the above questions we would like to ask you 
one more question about military service. 
Any criminal conviction you received during your time enlisted will result in 
revocation of sentence and you would be sent back to prison to serve out your 
original sentence.  Because this would be a condition of any deal, would you still 
agree to this? 
What is the maximum number of months of military service you would take 
to avoid serving 12 months actual time in prison? 
Have you personally ever served in the military?  
If yes, what branch of service? 
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APPENDIX B: 
Demographic and Contextual Survey Questions 
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  What year were you born? 
How do you describe yourself? 
1. Black/African American             4. Asian 
2. White                                           5. Hispanic 
3. American Indian                          6. Other 
Before now, had you ever spent time in an adult correctional facility, work 
center, or jail? 
Approximately how much total time did you spend in adult correctional 
centers or jails before this incarceration? 
Have you personally ever served in the military? 
If yes, what branch? 
 
 
